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Abstract: Using a long panel with broad grade coverage, I assess how charter schools af-
fect test scores, attendance, and discipline in order to establish whether these schools aect
cognitive and non-cognitive skill formation. Schools that begin as charters generate large
improvements in discipline and attendance but not test scores, with the exception of math
scores in middle schools. I interpret this as re
ecting improvements in non-cognitive skills
but not cognitive skills. These improvements do not persist if students return to regular pub-
lic schools. Charters that convert from regular public schools have little impact on cognitive
or non-cognitive skill formation. These results are robust to potential bias from selection o
of pre-charter trends, attrition and persistence.
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One of the fastest growing education reforms in the US today is the charter school move-
ment. Charter schools operate under a contract, called a charter, with a government agency.
These schools are provided a degree of autonomy from local school boards and freedom from
some regulations in return for additional accountability requirements. Despite often being
managed by private organizations, charters are public schools and receive almost all of their
funding from government sources. Since 1997 the number of charter schools in the US has
increased almost six fold, and the number of charter students has more than doubled since
1999, as is shown in Figure 1. As of 2006, 1.15 million students nationwide attended charter
schools.
One of the largest questions in the charter literature is how charter schools aect the
outcomes of students who attend them. It is unclear whether charters are benecial or
detrimental to students. On one hand, charters have fewer regulatory burdens and are at
higher risk of being shut down if they under-perform, thus providing incentives to increase
eort. On the other hand, charters have high levels of student turnover and eliminating some
regulations may be detrimental to students. In addition to this theoretical ambiguity, the em-
pirical evidence has been mixed. Of the papers which use more advanced econometric tech-
niques, some researchers nd insignicant or negative impacts of attending a charter school
(Zimmer, Blanc, Gill and Christman, 2008; Hanushek, Kain, Rivkin and Branch, 2007; Betts,
Rice, Zau, Tang and Koedel, 2006; Bifulco and Ladd, 2006; Sass, 2006; Zimmer and Bud-
din, 2006; Zimmer and Buddin, 2003), while others nd positive impacts (Hoxby and Mu-
rarka, 2008; Booker, Gilpatric, Gronberg and Jansen, 2007; McClure, Strick, Jacob-Almeida
and Reicher, 2005; Hoxby and Rocko, 2004; Solmon and Goldschmidt, 2004; Solmon, Paark
and Garcia, 2001).2 Thus, the eect of charter schools on student outcomes is unclear.
One of the potential reasons for the wide variation in results is that some charter schools
2Of these all but Hoxby (2008), McClure (2005), and Hoxby and Rocko (2004) utilize xed-eects or
some similar identication strategy. These papers instead use admission lotteries into charters as natural
experiments.
1may not see test scores as their primary output. Many charters focus on students with
special needs such as those who are over-age for their grade, new immigrants, or students
who have diculty behaving well in a normal school environment. These students often need
instruction not just in their academic ability - cognitive skills - but in motivation, self-esteem,
and self-discipline which are types of non-cognitive skills.
The distinction between how cognitive skills and non-cognitive skills are aected by
eduction interventions has become increasingly important in light of recent research showing
that non-cognitive skills have substantial in
uence on labor market outcomes and degree
attainment (Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua, 2006; Heckman and Rubinstein, 2001). Thus, if
charters improve non-cognitive skills while having a limited eect on cognitive skills, these
schools could still be eective tools for improving students' later-life outcomes.
Unfortunately, it is very dicult to measure non-cognitive skills directly. While testing of
achievement is common in schools, other skills are rarely, if ever, tested. However, Heckman,
Urzua, and Stixrud (2006) establish that both cognitive and non-cognitive skills improve
behavioral outcomes. Thus if charters improve behavior and attendance rates, it could
be indicative of improvement in non-cognitive skills even if cognitive skills - measured by
achievement - do not improve. In particular, attendance is a logical proxy for self discipline
and motivation. In addition, behavior and attendance are potentially important outcomes
on their own since parents consider behavior to be an important factor in the decision on
whether to send their children to charters. For example, in a survey of Texas charter parents,
Weiher and Tedin (2002) show that only one-quarter of parents list test scores as the primary
reason for sending their children to charters while more than two-thirds cite moral values,
discipline, or safety.
Thus, I utilize a unique dataset from a large urban school district in the southwest
(LUSD-SW) to provide a broad look at achievement, student discipline, and attendance and
establish whether there is evidence of charter schools aecting cognitive or non-cognitive
skills. To my knowledge, no study has considered how charters aect both of these skill sets.
2This panel is also useful in that it provides wider coverage over time and grades than any
previous study of charter schools. In total I have test score data for grades 1 - 11 over 9
years, during which charter schools were operating in each year. Attendance and discipline
data covers grades 1 - 12 over 13 years. Using test scores with wide grade coverage appears
particularly important, as limiting to the gradespans covered in Hanushek, Kain, Rivkin
(2007) and Branch, Gilpatric, Gronberg and Jansen (2007) provide dierent results. In
addition, I am able to look in detail at long-term impacts of charter schools while students
are enrolled in charters and after they return to regular public schools, both of which have
only rarely been studied in prior work while these studies used samples that did not include
high school students.3 Whether or not charter schools generate lasting impacts is particularly
important. For the foreseeable future, the stock of charter schools in the US will be small
relative to non-charters. Thus most students who enter charters in elementary and middle
school will return to non-charter schools before leaving the public school system. If charters
provide short-term benets but no long-term benets, the usefulness of these schools for
generating human capital improvements will be limited. Hence, through studying multiple
outcomes, using a broad base of students over a long time frame, and analyzing long-term
eects I provide a comprehensive and wide-ranging analysis of charter school impacts on
charter students.
I separate my analysis by two types of charters - startups and conversions. Previous
work has shown these schools to dier in their impacts (Sass, 2006; Bifulco and Ladd, 2006;
Zimmer, et. al., 2003) thus considering them together could lead to aggregation bias.4
In addition, identifying whether these schools provide dierent impacts may have policy
implications, since states and districts could allow only one type when starting a charter
3Booker et. al. (2007) nd that student performance improves as time in charters increase and also when
they leave charters. Bifulco and Ladd (2006) also look at how students perform in their rst year in a charter
and later years separately and nd that rst-year results were considerably worse. My strategy also diers
from these two studies as I am able to instrument for students' charter exit decision which aects both the
time-in-charter and persistence results.
4Hanushek, et. al. (2007) and Booker et. al. (2007) do not disaggregate by these charter types. However,
in Texas only a few charters are conversions.
3program, as is the case in Iowa, Mississippi, and Nevada. Startup charters are schools which
begin as charters and enrollment is voluntary. Conversions in LUSD are schools that were
previously regular public schools which convert to charter status. They keep the same sta,
location, and attendance zones, thus most of their students are assigned based on location of
residence like any normal school. Both types of charters benet from exemptions from some
regulations. Nonetheless, we would expect little impact from conversions since the change
in the structure of the school is minimal. My results show this to generally be true.
Startup charters, on the other hand, generate impacts on student outcomes. While I
nd no statistically signicant eect overall from attending a startup charter on test scores,
there is an improvement in math for students in middle school grades of 0.07 to 0.18 standard
deviations. Nonetheless, despite these test score nding, students gain large and statistically
signicant improvements in attendance and discipline from attending startup charters. On
average, attendance rates increase by 2.4 percentage points. This is 23% of the absence rate
in the year prior to charter entry. Startups also reduce annual disciplinary infractions by
0.5 to 0.8 instances. This is a very large impact relative to the average of 1.1 infractions
in the year prior to entry. However, these results do not persist after students return to
non-charter schools. In particular, attendance and discipline impacts disappear immediately
after students return to regular public schools. Thus, while the impact of startup charters
on cognitive skills is small, they generate a substantial improvement in non-cognitive skills.
However, the drop-o after students return to regular public schools shows that these skills
require continual reinforcement in students.
Nonetheless, one should be cautious in this interpretation as there are other potential
explanations for the behavior results. One possibility is that charters dier from regular
public schools in how they enforce or report discipline. This is an important concern and,
as such, while it is not possible to completely rule out this explanation, I provide a series of
tests and arguments that show that it is unlikely this is driving the results. Of particular
importance is that the strong attendance results, which are much harder for the charters
4to manipulate than discipline, serve to reinforce the discipline results and the fact that
both measures show large and signicant improvements provide evidence that there are
non-cognitive skill improvements.
In addition to having multiple outcomes and the ability to assess long-term charter im-
pacts, I also address some econometric issues. One potential econometric problem is that
the assumptions underlying xed-eects are invalid if students choose to attend charter
schools based on changes in outcomes. If this occurs then the estimates of charter im-
pacts may be contaminated by mean reversion. This phenomenon has been widely noted in
the job-training literature (Heckman and Smith, 1999; Ashenfelter, 1978) while, in educa-
tion, mean-reversion has been shown to occur in standardized exams (Chay, McEwan and
Urquiola, 2005). Hanushek, et. al. (2007) use interrupted panel estimates to argue that
this selection does not pose a problem. While I nd some graphical evidence of this type
of selection in startup charters, my interrupted panel estimates also show little change from
baseline. Thus, while this selection does appear to exist, it does not substantially change
the impact estimates.
Another potential problem is non-random attrition. This could create bias if the reason
charter students leave the district for other schools at a rate that diers from public school
students. While LUSD is a central city school district, it is bordered by 10 school districts.
It also has many state charter schools and private schools within its boundaries. Thus
there are a lot of educational options to parents and hence we need to be concerned about
the attrition bias. Other papers have also shown that attrition bias in charter research is
a potential problem. For example, Hanushek, et. al. (2007) nd that charter students
leave Texas public schools at more than 2.5 times the rate of non-charter students. To
address this, in addition to tests for dierential attrition, I utilize a unique semi-parametric
attrition adjustment procedure for xed-eects analyses proposed by Kyriazidou (1997). This
procedure has not been previously used to assess charter impacts. These results suggest that
non-random attrition does not has a substantial eect on the charter impact estimates.
52 LUSD Characteristics and Data Description
LUSD-SW was one of the rst school districts in the US to institute a charter program. The
program began in 1996 with two schools but in 1997 and 1998 expanded to half its current
size. By 2006 there were 32 charter schools, 23 startups and 9 conversions.5 Students from
nearly 300 non-charter schools are also observed in the panel. During the time period studied,
approximately 50 state charter schools were also in operation for which I do not have data.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the charter program in LUSD by examining the fraction
of enrollment in startup and conversion charters. In 1997 and 1998 all of the conversions
obtained charter status after which their enrollment shrank relative to total growth. Most of
the startup charters opened in 1998 and 2001, but their population steadily increased over
time. As of the 2006-2007 school year four percent of students in LUSD attended a charter
school. Table 1 provides some summary information about charter schools and students.
Startup students are more likely to be minority, poorer, and more at-risk than non-charter.
The schools themselves are smaller on average and spend more per-student on instruction
but less on other expenses. Conversions are also more heavily minority and poorer than
regular public schools but are otherwise similar.6
In this paper I utilize a unique set of administrative records from a large urban school
district in the southwest. This dataset includes information on scores from the Stanford
Achievement Test, disciplinary records, attendance rates, and a number of student charac-
teristics. By combining these outcomes I assess to what extent charter schools aect both
cognitive and non-cognitive skill development. The data cover the 1994-1995 to 2006-2007
5One charter existed under contract with LUSD prior to the enactment of the state's charter laws and
then promptly switched. Since enrollment is voluntary I dene it as a startup. Some startups reside on the
campus of an existing school but are considered independent schools and have voluntary enrollment. One
conversion charter maintains a large gifted and talented magnet program. In order to prevent the impact
of this program from in
uencing the charter impact estimates I drop any student who attends that school
from the analysis, leaving 8 conversions in the nal sample.
6Startup charters tend to be spread across all grade levels. There are thirteen startups covering at least
one elementary grade, twelve covering at least one middle, and eight covering at least one high school grade.
Since charters often diverge from the standard grade structure, these numbers only refer to 23 schools. Seven
of the eight conversions I study cover at least one elementary grade. Three cover at least one middle school
grades, but only one of these include grades 7 or 8. There are no high school conversions
6academic years and I am able to follow individual students for as long as they attend school
in LUSD, providing a long time-series on many students.7 Hence, I am also able to look at
how these skills develop in the long-term both during and after charter exposure.
LUSD started giving the Stanford Achievement test in the fall of 1997 and then subse-
quently winter of 1999 and every year thereafter in February or March. Since the 1997 test
was given early in the school year I use the test scores from the 1998-99 school years and
later. Thus the data includes nine years of test score data. The exam is norm-referenced,
thus it re
ects achievement relative to a national sample of students. Three exam subjects -
math, reading and language - were given in grades 1 - 11 and thus I analyze these. For each
subject I standardize the scaled scores to be mean zero, standard deviation one within grade
and year across LUSD. Hence, impacts are measured in standard deviation units relative to
the district average. In order to ensure that the impacts are analyzed on the same sets of
students across all tests, after standardizing the scores I limit the sample to students who
have scores for all three exams.8. The nal sample for test scores includes approximately
1.14 million student-year observations including 15,000 startup and 20,000 conversion char-
ter observations. In Table 1 we see that for both types of charters the test score means are
not statistically signicantly dierent from regular public schools.
Discipline and attendance records of students cover 1994 through 2006 for all students in
grades 1 - 12. The attendance rate provides the percent of days the student attends school
while he or she is enrolled. Discipline records provide information on the type and length
of punishment for any infraction that results in an in-school suspension or more severe
7After dropping observations for early education, pre-kindergarten, and kindergarten, 56% of students
who are rst observed in the data prior to ninth grade have at least four observations. In addition, only 27%
of startup charter and 21% of conversion charter students have neither pre nor post-charter observations.
8Some students who are not procient enough in English in grades 1-8 took a separate Spanish language
exam called Aprenda. While I have data on these exam results, the scores are not directly comparable to
those of students taking the English exam so I do not include them in the analysis. Almost all students who
take Aprenda are in grades 1 - 5 and account for 24% of all test-takers in those grades. One concern is that,
since startups include fewer LEP or special education students, and thus only a handful of Aprenda takers,
the Stanford Achievement Test results may be biased. However, test score regressions limited to students
who are not classied as LEP or special education for the duration of the test sample show similar results
to the baseline regressions. Hence, this is not a substantial problem.
7punishment.9 I use the total number of disciplinary infractions per year in most of the
analyses. Across LUSD, 17% of student-year observations have at least one infraction and
9% have multiple infractions. For startup charters those gures are 8% and 3%, respectively
and for conversions they are 14% and 6%. In total the sample for discipline and attendance
includes 2.23 million observations of which 20,000 are students in startups and 40,000 are
students in conversions. Once again returning to Table 1, we see that on average startup
charters have signicantly lower overall infraction rates and fewer ghting infractions than
non-charters. Conversions have fewer substance abuse and violent crime infractions. Means
for attendance are not statistically signicantly dierent from regular public schools for either
charter type. Thus, the summary statistics provide suggestive evidence of there being little
impact on test scores for either charter type but some improvement in behavior for startup
charters. This is consistent with charters improving non-cognitive skills but not cognitive
skills. Thus, to conrm this result we turn to regression analysis.
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 Baseline Model
In order to identify whether charters improve cognitive and non-cognitive skills, I utilize the
following individual xed-eects model:
(1) yit = +CConversionit+SStartupit+Demogit +Switchit+Gradeyearit	+i+it
where yit is some outcome measure for student i at time t, Conversionit and Startupit are
indicators for the type of charter the student is enrolled in status, Demogit is a vector of
time-variant observable demographic characteristics, Gradeyearit is a set of grade-by-year
9Unfortunately, infractions that generate less harsh punishments, such as detention, are not in the data.
In addition, the records provide only limited information on the type of infraction, since 80% of infractions are
unspecied student code violations. Nonetheless, a few severe infractions such as substance abuse, criminal
behavior and, for 2002 and later, ghting are identied in the data.
8indicator variables which account for changes in outcomes over time and grade level, i is
dened as above, and it is i.i.d. error.10 Switchit is a set of variables that dene whether a
student changes schools in year t due to a structural change from normal grade progression,
a non-structural change for some other reason, or if it's the student's rst year in the district.
All of these variables are interacted with indicators for the student's grade level.11
A problem with this strategy is that prior test scores play a role in current achievement.
To address this, researchers often use a value added (or gains) version of the xed-eects
model where the dependent variable the annual change in outcomes.12 This is equivalent
to assuming that if lagged achievement is an explanatory variable then its coecient equals
one. Since the role of lagged achievement likely decays, we may prefer a model that explicitly
includes lagged achievement as an explanatory variable, as in Hanushek, et. al. (2007) and
Sass (2006)
yit = + yi;t 1 + CConversionit + SStartupit + Demogit 
+ Switchit + Gradeyearit	 + i + it:13
(2)
Since lagged scores are endogenous, these papers instrument with twice-lagged scores. How-
ever, recent research has suggested that factors in children's distant youth play important
roles in later achievement (Todd and Wolpin, 2004) suggesting that twice-lagged scores are
unlikely to be exogenous and thus the estimates in these papers may be biased.
10Demogit includes free-lunch status, reduced-price lunch status, other economic disadvantage, whether
the student is a recent immigrant, and whether a parent is a migrant worker. Other economic disadvantage
indicates the student does not receive free or reduced-price lunch but does receive other poverty assistance.
More detailed denitions are in the online appendix.
11Hanushek, et. al. (2007)(, Booker, et. al. (2007), Bifulco and Ladd (2006) suggest that properly
controlling for student switches is important for separating charter impacts from the eects of switching
schools. I follow Bifulco and Ladd and dene a non-structural switch as switching into a school where less
than 10% of a student's previous class switches into the same school. Conversely, a student undergoes a
structural switch when more than 10% of his or her previous class switch into the same school. Thus, 12%
of student-years undergo non-structural switches, 11% of student-years undergo structural switches and 12%
are students moving from outside of the district.
12Alternatively once could use a random trend model where both sides of the estimating equation are
dierenced then demeaned. While this allows for individual time trends, it substantially reduces precision
and could exacerbate bias if the trends are non-linear. Nonetheless, estimates from this model are similar
to the baseline levels models.
9As an alternative, I use both levels and value-added models. In expectation these two
models bound the true estimate which would be identied by equation (2). I provide the
proof of this in the appendix. Thus, I am able to identify charter impacts within a range of
values while avoiding biases that are introduced by endogenous instruments.
3.2 Potential Biases from Selection
While attending any school is a choice, for most charters parents are not restricted by having
to live an a specic attendance zone or meet some transfer qualication. Thus, selection into
charters may be a more substantial problem than selection into regular public schools. The
student xed-eects analysis used in this paper corrects for selection into charters based o of
unobserved characteristics that do not change over time, such as innate ability. Nonetheless,
we may be concerned of selection due to time-varying factors. While I cannot eliminate all
types of selection that could play a role, I am able to check for a few specic types that
would be particularly important in the charter context.14 My main ndings that there is
little improvement of cognitive skills but substantial improvement in non-cognitive skills
from attending a startup charter are robust to these potential biases.
The rst issue I consider is whether entry into charter schools is based on pre-entry
trends in the dependent variable (Booker, Gilpatric, Gronberg and Jansen, 2007; Hanushek,
Kain, Rivkin and Branch, 2007; Bifulco and Ladd, 2006; Sass, 2006). We may suspect
that students enter charter schools due to changes in test scores or behavior, or a change
in some strong correlate with these outcomes. Such a situation has been widely noted
14Another solution is to use oversubscription lotteries as natural experiments (Hoxby and Murarka, 2008;
McClure, Strick, Jacob-Almeida and Reicher, 2005; Hoxby and Rocko, 2004). While a lottery based
strategy has substantial advantages over xed-eects, there are three potentially undesirable aspects. First,
oversubscribed schools are likely of higher quality than schools with spaces available, hence a comparison of
lottery winners and losers will only identify the impacts for the best charter schools. Second, lottery studies
may be subject to more attrition bias than panel studies, since parents who lose lotteries may be more likely
to send their children to private schools or other districts than those who win. Third, often lotteries are
limited to a very small number of schools - four in the case of Hoxby and Rocko (2004) and one in the case
of McClure, et. al. (2006). Nonetheless, Hoxby and Muraka (2008) are able to address all three of these
concerns well as their sample of NYC charter schools has 40 schools with lotteries and they appear to have
little attrition bias.
10in the job-training literature and is commonly called \Ashenfelter's dip" (Heckman and
Smith, 1999; Ashenfelter, 1978). Since a parent may see a drop in performance as an indicator
that the current school does not meet his or her child's needs, it is reasonable to believe that
students change schooling environments in response to poor performance. This violates the
strict exogeneity assumption for xed-eects, which requires that future and past outcomes
are not aected by current charter status. While much of this problem is dealt with by
appropriately controlling for students' switching status, I provide evidence that some small
\dips" remain for startup charters. Thus, I follow Hanushek, et. al. (2007) in the use of
interrupted panel estimates to check for bias from endogenous charter entry. In addition,
regressions that look at how charter impacts vary with time spent in a charter are used to
check for mean reversion, which would be a sign that the estimates suer from this bias.
Another problem is that some parents may choose to leave LUSD altogether if students
perform poorly in charter schools. If this occurs at a dierent rate than in regular public
schools conditioning on observables and student xed-eects then there are time periods
when these students should be observed but are not. This could lead to attrition bias. For
LUSD this is particularly important as there are many other options available to students
including private schools, state charters, and more than ten suburban school districts. Figure
3 provides some suggestive evidence that endogenous attrition is a problem. While about
16% of non-charter students exit LUSD each year, 26% of startup charter students attrit.
Though not shown in the gure, the dierences are more dramatic over longer time periods.
For example, 39% of non-charter third graders in 1998 - 2000 are no longer in LUSD ve years
later while that number is 43% for conversion students and 63% for startup students. These
statistics may simply re
ect dierent characteristics of the schools such as dierent grade
levels covered or the types of students who attend Indeed, regressions of attrition propensity
on charter status including all of the covariates in equation (1) show no statistically signicant
relationship between charter status and attrition propensity at all grade levels.15 However, a
15In the model with a pooled estimate across all grade levels the coecient on attrition from startups is
0.037 (s.e. 0.025) and conversions is 0.003 (s.e. 0.010).
11model that interacts charter status with test scores show that startup students with higher
reading scores and conversion students with higher math scores are less likely to attrit than
comparable non-charter students. These results can be found in the online appendix.
Thus, while dierential attrition appears to only be a minor problem the evidence so
far is not overwhelming. As such, I use a non-parametric procedure for correcting sample
selection in individual xed-eects models proposed by Kyriazidou (1997) to further check
for attrition bias. Her insight is that, since xed-eects correct for attrition based on time-
invariant factors, one can correct for endogenous attrition due to time-variant factors by
weighting towards observations where there is no change in attrition propensity.
To produce Kyriazidou's (1997) estimator, one must rst dene the selection equation,
(3) sit = Wit
 + i + it
where Wit is a set of variables that are observed whether or not the individual has attrited, i
is an individual specic xed-eect, and it is random i.i.d. error. Wit need not contain all
(or any) of the variables in the outcome equation, but it does need to contain an exclusion
restriction. In this paper I use a model that includes the student's last observed startup
or conversion charter status, free lunch status interacted with grade-level, reduced-price
lunch interacted with grade level, other economic disadvantage interacted with grade level,
recent immigration status, whether a parent is a migrant worker, grade-by-year indicators,
and whether the student is ineligible to attend his or her previous school due to his or her
predicted grade not being oered, which serves the exclusion restriction.1617 This model is
estimated using a conditional \xed-eects" logit. The outcome equation in my model is
the baseline charter impact equation.
After removing the xed-eect in the outcome equation through rst-dierencing, Kyr-
16The idea behind this exclusion restriction is that a student would be more likely to leave the district if
she has to switch schools anyway; that is the relative costs of leaving the district falls if students are forced
to switch schools.
17For attrited observations I use the grade the student would have been in assuming normal grade pro-
gression
12iazidou argues that in observations where (Wit   Wis)
 = 0 for s < t, the individual has
not had a change in circumstances which aect attrition. Since a student's innate tendency
to switch schools is captured by xed-eects we can generate consistent estimates of  ; the
charter eect, by using only those observations where this holds true.
Since limiting to observations where (Wit  Wis)
 = 0 would reduce power substantially,
Kyriazidou proposes using kernel weights to focus the analysis on observations that are close
to (Wit   Wis)
 = 0. Thus, in the second stage I run a rst-dierenced version of (1)
weighted by








where K is a kernel function with bandwidth hn and (Wit   Wi;t 1)b 
 is the rst-dierenced
linear prediction from the selection model estimation.18
A third problem that could arise is bias from students leaving the charters and returning
to the regular public schools. Both the possibility that students leave because they perform
poorly in charters and that charters have long-term impacts on outcomes can contribute to
the bias. In the rst case, if students leave charters prematurely due to poor performance
then they will reduce the number of charter period observations reducing the in
uence of bad
charters. In the second case, charters that have long-term impacts that persist when students
return to regular public schools will also aect periods when students are not in charters,
thus biasing impacts towards zero.19 To solve both of these problems, I conduct analyses
that include indicators for whether a student is in a \post-charter" period which allows us
to compare charter impacts directly to pre-charter periods while identifying whether charter
18The appropriate bandwidth is found using the mean-squared error (MSE) minimization procedure de-
scribed in Kyriazidou (1997). Since the MSE minimizing bandwidth is sensitive to the initial value, I follow
Dustman and Rochina-Barrachina (2000) in using the initial value that is as close as possible to the constant
for the MSE minimizing bandwidth as asymptotic theory says the two should converge. I use the Gaussian
kernel to generate the weights.
19This is a violation of the strict exogeneity assumption for xed-eects which implies that outcomes in
future and past periods cannot be correlated with current charter status conditioning on observables and
the xed-eect.
13impacts persist after students return to regular public schools.20
(5)








+ Demogit  + Switchit + Gradeyearit	 + i + it
where PostStartupk and PostConversionk denote the student being in year k after leaving
the charter. For k = 4, I include any time period after the third year. To account for
students endogenously exiting charters, I instrument for being in a post-charter period with
the whether the student is the listed number of predicted grades past his or her previous
charter's highest grade covered. I use predicted grades where I calculate normal grade
progression starting from the year of charter entry.21 This avoids potential complications
from the charter's retention policies. For example, the estimator for being one year post
startup is instrumented using whether the student is one predicted grade level higher than
the highest grade covered in the charter school he or she attended. Thus, we are able to
isolate the eects from students who are forced out of charters due to being grade-ineligible,
instead of those who leave voluntarily, possibly because they do not perform well in the
charter
4 Results
4.1 Charter School Impacts on Student Outcomes
I now turn to my main results. We start with test scores to see how charter schools aect
cognitive skill development. First, in Figure 4 I provide graphs that trace out the residuals
20It is possible to be in a conversion charter and also in a post-startup period at the same time (and
conversely for startup and post-conversion), however only 2% of charter students ever attend both types.
21While I do not include Kindergarten in the analysis, as there are no test scores for this grade and
enrollment is optional in LUSD, I am able to identify whether a student enters a charter in Kindergarten.
14of student outcomes from a xed eects regression including all of the covariates in model
(1) except charter status. Thus, we are able to look at how outcomes change as students
enter charters net of xed student characteristics, economic status, immigration status, grade
level, and time. The top row shows startup charters, which are the type of charter we would
most expect to see charter impacts. While math scores seem to increase after entry, reading
and language show far less improvement. The graphs also show some evidence of selection
into the charter o of pre-charter trends since test scores drop in the year immediately prior
to entry (-1), which could potentially bias the estimates. For conversions, test scores appear
to fall o slightly after entry. Thus the graphs suggest that, with the possible exception of
math in startups, cognitive skill improvement is small at best.
Table 2 provides the main test score results for this paper along with the interrupted
panel and Kyriazidou (1997) estimates. The standard errors for each regression are robust
to heteroscedasticity and clustered by school. The baseline results for startups conrm the
graphical analysis as there is no statistically signicant impact of startup charters on test
scores in levels or value-added models. With the exception of math in levels all of the
point estimates are relatively close to zero. Thus, these results suggest that there is little
improvement in cognitive skills in startup charters on average. For conversions while math
in levels is statistically signicant at 0.07 standard deviations, the value added estimate is
insignicant and thus we cannot say that conversions have a math impact.22 In addition, this
impact will disappear when we consider the role of persistence. One should note that these
results dier considerably from those restricting grade span coverage to 3 - 8 in levels and 4
- 8 in value-added models. These are the grade spans used by Hanushek, et. al. (2007) and
Booker, et. al. (2007). These regressions show positive and statistically signicant impacts
on math and language in startups and thus underscore the importance of having data on a
22At-risk, LEP, gifted & talented, and special education status could be useful covariates but they are also
potentially in
uenced by school quality or charters may not classify students the same way as non-charters.
As such, these variables would also be inappropriate as outcomes. Nonetheless adding LEP, at-risk status,
gifted & talented status, and special education status to the baseline model has very little eect on the
estimates.
15wide range of grades.23
The next two rows show the interrupted panel estimates.24 These estimates account for
the pre-entry dips seen in Figure 4. These estimates are close to the baseline results regardless
of whether one or two years prior are dropped. A possible exception is math for conversions
in the value-added models where the impact increases to 0.07 standard deviations, but is
only signicant at the 10% level. The last three rows provide estimates using the Kyriazidou
(1997) attrition correction procedure. Since this relies on a rst-dierenced estimator rather
than a xed-eects estimator I use these to examine how much estimates change when the
attrition corrections are applied rather than as true impact estimates. The unweighted
model is the rst-dierences corollary to the baseline model in the rst row. If attrition is
a problem then we would expect there to be large changes in the estimates as the weights
are added. I show both models using mean-squared error minimizing weights and weights
where the bandwidths are 1/4 of the MSE minimizing bandwidths. While startup math
impacts increase and become statistically signicant in value-added models, levels models
are still statistically insignicant and change little. There is also some increase for language
in conversions. Nonetheless, these results at worst suggest that we may be slightly under-
estimating math scores for startups and language scores for conversions, but in general the
baseline results hold up well.
Thus, we see that startup charters have no signicant eect on cognitive skills. However,
it is still unclear how charters aect non-cognitive skills. Since many startup charters in
LUSD target students with behavioral problems and those who are classied as \at-risk" of
dropping out of school, we may expect them to focus more on non-cognitive then cognitive
skills. While some cognitive skill improvement spills into discipline and attendance, the
23Results are provided in the online appendix.
24In value-added models Hanushek, et. al. (2007) keep the gain in the rst charter year as the dierence
between year t and t - 1. Thus, while this reduces the bias from the pre-charter gain measures it does not
reduce bias from the excessive gain in the rst charter year. I modify the procedure such that the dependant
variable in the value-added models is the average gain over the dropped years. Thus, when year t-1 is
dropped, I use the dierence in test scores in t and t - 2 divided by 2. Both strategies provide similar results
for all outcomes.
16lack of test score impacts imply that improvements in these outcomes would likely be due
to non-cognitive skill enhancement. Figure 5 provides the same graphs for discipline and
attendance as Figure 4 provides for test scores. While there is little change in either of
these measures after charter entry for conversions, the gures show drops in disciplinary
infractions and increases in attendance rates immediately after entry. In both cases there
is some reversion after the rst year, but both outcomes remain at levels that improve on
pre-entry performance. As in the case with test scores, however, there is evidence of selection
into charters o of worsening attendance, so once again we need to use interrupted panel
estimates to address this potential bias.
Panel A of Table 3 shows the baseline, interrupted panel, and attrition adjusted results for
discipline and attendance. While there are no statistically signicant estimates in any model
for conversion charters, startup charters have large and statistically signicant improvements
in discipline and attendance. Using the levels and value-added model estimates as bounds,
baseline estimates in the rst row show annual disciplinary infractions falling by between 0.5
and 0.8 incidences when students attend startup charters. These estimates are statistically
signicant at the 1% level. Average infractions in the year prior to charter entry is 1.1 so the
startup charter impact is between 45% and 73% of the pre-charter mean. Startups also have
statistically signicant impacts at the 1% level on attendance. Baseline estimates show an
increase of 2.3 percentage points. In the year prior to entry, attendance rates average 91.0%
so the attendance impact accounts for 26% of the pre-charter absence rate. In addition,
despite the graphical evidence for the Ashenfelter dips, discipline and attendance results
hold in the interrupted panel and attrition adjusted estimates. Thus, it appears that startup
charter improve non-cognitive skill formation.
Since LUSD audits attendance by checking teacher's logs with reported attendance,
any systematic misreporting would require participation of administrators and teachers,
which would be very dicult. Thus, we can be condent that the attendance results re
ect
actual behavioral improvements. Nonetheless, it is possible that the discipline results are
17due to dierences in enforcement or reporting rather than actual behavior improvements. To
address this concern, I provide a few pieces of evidence that at least part of the impact re
ects
behavioral improvements. First, the large impact from attendance reinforces the discipline
results since they are highly correlated and both re
ect non-cognitive skill improvement.25
Second, regressions that use severe infractions - substance abuse, violent criminal activity,
and ghting - as outcomes show statistically signicant drops from attending a startup char-
ter. In levels models, substance abuse infractions fall by 0.015 (s.e. 0.006), violent crimes by
0.008 (s.e. 0.002) and ghting by 0.024 (s.e. 0.009).26 It is unlikely that principals punish stu-
dents for these infractions with punishments that are less severe than in-school suspensions,
thus improvements in these outcomes are most likely due to behavioral improvements.27
Third, at four to seven times the standard error, the enforcement or reporting bias would
need to be very large to make the discipline estimates statistically insignicant. Fourth,
a multinomial logit regression of type of punishment on charter status shows that startup
charter students were more likely to receive out-of-school suspensions than in-school sus-
pensions, suggesting that if anything punishments in startup charters are harsher than in
non-charters.28
Finally, in panel B of Table 3 the rst three columns provide results for some alternative
measures of discipline. Since these are all binary outcomes I only report level models. All
regressions include the same covariates as in the baseline regressions. I consider the eect of
attending a charter on whether the student has any disciplinary infractions during the year,
25An OLS regression of attendance rate on the number of infractions, free-lunch, reduced-price lunch, other
economic disadvantage, recent immigrant, parents' migrant status, gender, race, and grade-year interactions
provides a point estimate on infractions of -1.12 and a standard error (clustered by school) of 0.05.
26All standard errors are clustered by school. Value added models were not statistically signicant. How-
ever, since these are low-frequency events it is actually very rare to get more than one infraction in subsequent
years, thus it would be very dicult for value-added models to identify impacts on these outcomes
27In addition, for substance abuse and criminal infractions the principal is legally obligated to notify the
police department.
28The unit of observation is at the student-infraction level and the left-out category is in-school suspension.
The regression includes covariates for gender, race, free lunch, reduced-price lunch, other economic disad-
vantage, immigration status, whether student is a recent immigrant, whether the parent is a migrant worker,
infraction type - substance abuse, violent crime, non-violent crime, truancy, other - and grade-by-year dum-
mies. The estimate of attending a startup charter on out-of-school suspensions is statistically signicant at
the 5% level. These results are available upon request.
18whether the student is expelled, and whether the student is placed in alternative education.
Startup charters provide statistically signicant drops in likelihood of all three of these
outcomes. Conversion charters also show drops in expulsion rates and alternative education
placement, but these are substantially smaller than for startups. Thus, the discipline results
for startups are robust across multiple margins. The last column of panel B looks at retention.
Whether or not students are retained more in charters is potentially interesting but provides
an unclear interpretation. The results show a slight increase in retentions for startups, but
this is only signicant at the 10% level. Even if we accept this as a retention impact, the
interpretation is unclear. Higher retention could indicate that students perform worse, but
it could also indicate a policy dierence where charters are more likely to hold marginal
students back or that charters are better at identifying students who need to be held back.
So far, I have established that on average startup charters provide little improvement
in cognitive skills while generating large improvements in non-cognitive skills. Since this is
an average result, these impacts may vary by school and student characteristics. Table 4
provides some results on how charter impacts dier by grade-level and age of the charter.
Each regression includes main eects and interactions. Panel A looks at variation by grade
level. Since the there is only one conversion charter in the sample with grades 7 and 8
and none with grades 9 - 12, a pooled estimate for conversion charters is included in the
regression but not shown. In columns (1) - (3) we see that while elementary and high-school
startups have no statistically signicant impact on any test score, startups with grades 6 - 8
(middle school grades) fare quite well. All three of the estimates in levels models show that
students in these grades perform signicantly better than those in elementary grades and
tests of the sums of the main eects and the middle school interaction are also statistically
signicant at the 5% or higher level. However, for value-added models only math has a
statistically signicant combination of main and interaction eects. Thus middle school
startups increase math scores by 0.7 to 0.18 standard deviations while reading and language
increase by at most 0.07 and 0.08 standard deviations but I cannot rule out a zero eect
19for those. Hence, while on average there is little evidence of cognitive skill improvements
from startup charters, there is some weak evidence of improvements for middle schools.
Discipline and attendance results show evidence of non-cognitive skill improvements at all
grade levels. Elementary schools show improvement in discipline but not attendance while
other grade levels show improvements in both measures. Nonetheless, average attendance
rates are higher in elementary grades so there is less room for improvement. The district-wide
average is 96.4% for grades 1 - 5 and 92.6% for grades 6 and higher.
Panel B looks at how charter impacts vary by the age of the charter in levels models.
Value-added models provided similar results and are available in the online appendix. Pre-
vious work on charter schools have generally found that as charters age their test score
impacts improve (Booker, Gilpatric, Gronberg and Jansen, 2007; Hanushek, Kain, Rivkin
and Branch, 2007; Sass, 2006; Bifulco and Ladd, 2006). While I caution that since I have
31 charters there is less variation in this school level characteristic than in previous papers,
I nonetheless nd little evidence of improvement in test scores for startups or conversions as
the schools age. I do nd some evidence of improvement in discipline in startups as those
that are ve or more years old have 0.3 fewer annual disciplinary infractions per student
than rst-year startups. However, this is oset by lower attendance improvements after the
rst year. It is unclear why attendance rates would drop after the rst year. One possibility
is that schools that are new need to maintain a close knit community in order to succeed
and thus they try harder to induce students to attend.
In table 5 I consider how charter school impacts vary by student characteristics. Since
I do not nd substantial evidence of impacts for conversion charters, I report only the
estimates for startup charters.29 Each column in section A or B is a separate regression with
a main eect and interaction eects. No estimate for race is signicantly dierent from the
main eect in both levels and value-added models so we cannot say for sure if there is a
racial dierence. There are, however some notable dierences by gender. Women in startups
29Full results including conversion estimates are provided in the online appendix.
20appear to perform better on math tests than men by 0.03 to 0.06 standard deviations. While
somewhat tenuous, as the value-added estimate is only signicant at 10%, this is an intriguing
result as there has been considerable focus in education policy on how to improve math scores
for girls. Disciplinary infraction impacts, on the other hand, are smaller for girls, though
they still show large improvements. This is not surprising, however, as boys tend to have
more discipline problems on average. For economic status, there is no statistically signicant
dierence for any outcome. Immigrants do seem to have lower improvements in attendance
than non-immigrants, but the combined main eect and interaction is still positive.30
In Table 6 I investigate some mechanisms the charter impacts may work through. We
saw in Table 1 that startup charters have more instructional expenditures, less expenditures
on other functions, and are generally smaller than non-charter schools. Thus, seeing how the
impact estimates change as we control for these characteristics can provide insight into the
paths through which charters aect students. Nonetheless these covariates are potentially
endogenous, and thus we should be careful of interpreting any change in the charter impact
estimate as being causally determined by the added covariates. Tests score estimates for all
charters and discipline and attendance estimates for conversions are generally unaected by
adding these covariates so I leave those results in the online appendix.
The rst row repeats the baseline estimates from Tables 2 and 3. The second through
fth rows show what happens when we add dierent categories of per-student expenditures.
Adding these factors does not generate substantial changes in the impact estimates. In row 6
I control for the percent of each school that is white, Hispanic, black, LEP, special education,
gifted, and economically disadvantaged. In this case there is a drop in the discipline estimate
in value-added models to the point where it is only signicant at the 10% level. However,
all of the other estimates change little.
30An additional element of heterogeneity that one may expect to see is that students with pre-charter
behavioral problems improve more in startup charters than others since they drive the discipline results.
However regressions that interact charter status with infractions in the year prior to charter entry show that
test score improvements fall with the number of infractions, though not to the point where a large number
of students would have signicantly negative test score impacts. These results are available upon request.
21Row 7 controls for a quadratic in total school enrollment. Since startups tend to be
smaller than non-charters, administrators may nd it easier to maintain control over students
and to spend more time dealing with discipline problems. The results in row 7 are consistent
with this theory. When enrollment is added the disciplinary infraction estimate rises by
0.145 in levels and .373 in value-added models. While the levels estimate remains statistically
signicant, the value-added estimates becomes insignicant. Thus, it appears that school size
and peer characteristics may play roles in the discipline improvements found in the startup
charters. In particular, part of the discipline improvement may be due to administrators
having smaller schools that they can closely monitor.
4.2 Evolution of Charter Impacts Over Time
One of the key advantages of the LUSD-SW dataset is that the length and breadth of the
panel allows me to investigate some long-term impacts of charters on cognitive and non-
cognitive skills that most of the previous research is not able to do. First, in Table 7 I
provide results from regressions where charter impacts are allowed to vary by time spent in
a charter. We may suspect that initially a student may not perform well in a charter due
to the shock of having to change educational environments, but over time the student could
acclimate to the new environment and improve. On the other hand, it's possible that the
new environment of attending a charter could temporarily motivate the student and improve
performance but as time goes on the student may return to old habits.
In order to address the potential for endogenous exogenous exit I instrument for charter
attendance in any year after the rst. In this case I use the number of potential years a
student could have been in the charter. That is I subtract the rst grade oered in the
charter from the the grade the student is predicted to be in based on date of birth and
assuming normal grade progression. For test scores (columns 1 - 3) startup charters show
some evidence of improvement when students have been in a charter for four or more years,
but only in value-added models. Thus, there appears to be some weak evidence that students
22who spend long periods of time in startups improve but those who spend only short periods
of time in startups do no better or worse. For conversion charters it appears that test score
impacts remain roughly constant as time in the charter increases.31
Looking at columns (4)and (5), for discipline and attendance there appears to be improve-
ment as time in startup charters increase. For example in the rst year annual disciplinary
infractions are down by 0.8 in levels models. After the third year they are down by 1.6. An
F-test of this dierence is statistically signicant at the 5% level. Attendance also shows a
pattern of improvement. The pattern for discipline does not hold for startups in value-added
models. This suggests that discipline improves substantially in the rst year, but further
improvements in subsequent years are small. Nonetheless, discipline impacts do increase as
time spent in the charter increases. These results also show that there is no mean reversion
in charter impacts, and thus provides further evidence that the pre-entry dips in test scores
and attendance do not impose substantial bias.
I now turn to how charter impacts persist after students return to regular public schools.
Analyzing persistence informs us as to whether the skills students learn in charters remain
without the need for reinforcement. Persistence can also generate bias in the impact estimates
since some of the impact would be attributed to non-charter periods. First, gures 6 and
7 provide an initial look at whether charter impacts persist by graphing residuals from the
regressions used for gures 4 and 5 for students before and after they leave charters. In gure
6, we see that after charter exit math test scores drop for startups and all subjects drop for
conversions. In gure 7, we also see that the discipline and attendance gains achieved while
students are enrolled in startups drop o after they leave. These measures are relatively
stable after students leave conversions. Thus these results suggest that charter impacts do
not persist after students leave.
In table 8 I provide regression results that account for the persistence of charter impacts
when students return to regular public schools. The table shows 2SLS results using the
31The 2SLS models are somewhat dierent from OLS models which show improvement in startup charters
over time. These results are available in the online appendix.
23instrument for \post-charter" periods described at the end of section 3.2. Since two and
three years after attending a charter provide results similar to one and four-plus years, I
only show the latter combination, though the F-tests are for all four categories.32 Test
scores are provided in columns (1) - (3), discipline in column (4) and attendance in column
(5). Each column in panel A and panel B refer to a single regression.
First, for conversion charters, any signicant positive impacts found in the baseline mod-
els become statistically insignicant. This provides additional conrmation that conversion
charters are ineective at improving student outcomes. Turning to the results for startups,
we see in columns (1), (2) and (3) that after leaving the charter students perform well on test
scores in the rst year, with statistically signicant and positive impacts in the levels models
for math and language. Nonetheless almost all of the other estimates for post-startup test
scores are either negative or statistically insignicant. Thus, the evidence for persistence in
test scores for startups is weak. As such, the estimates for the startup impact on test scores
remain statistically insignicant in all models.
In columns (4) and (5) we see that after startup students return to regular public schools
disciplinary infractions increase and attendance fall to the point where they do not dier
from non-charter students33 While it is true that in the post-charter periods the students
are older and thus we would expect these outcomes to rise, the inclusion of grade-by-year
indicators corrects for this problem. Thus, there is no persistent impact of startup charters
on non-cognitive skills.
The most likely explanation for these results is that the non-cognitive skill improvements
from startup charters need continual reinforcement or else they dissipate. Hence, while the
startups provide an environment that helps the student improve behavior and attendance,
once they return to regular public schools they lose the benet of that environment. An
alternative explanation is that the estimated impacts re
ect reporting and enforcement bias
32OLS and complete 2SLS results are available in the online appendix.
33The F-Test of the post-startup estimates in column 4 is signicant because the two year and three year
estimates are both positive 0.3 and statistically signicant.
24in charters. However, as discussed in section 4.1 it is highly unlikely that attendance rates
are manipulated while the discipline results appear to be, at least partially, due to real
behavioral changes.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate the eect of charter schools on students who attend them using
data from a large urban school district in the southwest (LUSD-SW) with an extensive
charter program. I provide a broad outlook on charter schools by focusing on multiple
outcomes and using a panel with wide grade coverage and long time frames to provide
analyses of long-term impacts both while in and after attending charters. By combining
analyses of test scores with discipline and attendance impacts, I am able to identify whether
charter schools aect both cognitive and non-cognitive skill formation.
I nd that, while charters that convert from regular public schools to charter status have
little eect on cognitive or non-cognitive skills, schools that begin as charters, called startup
charters, generate large improvements in non-cognitive skills as proxied by discipline and
attendance. Disciplinary infractions drop by 0.5 to 0.8 instances per year compared to a pre-
charter mean of 1.1 while attendance rates rise by 2.3 percentage points which is equivalent
to 26% of the pre-charter mean. These impacts are statistically signicant at the 1% level
across many models and specication checks. While discipline and attendance impacts could
also be caused by cognitive skill enhancements, I can only establish improvements in test
scores for math in middle school startups whereas estimates for elementary and high schools
are close to zero on all test score measures. Hence, I interpret the discipline and attendance
results as showing that startup charters generate non-cognitive skill improvements. These
individual xed-eects results are robust to potential biases from selection into charters o
of trends in outcomes and attrition.
The long and broad nature of my panel also allows me to follow students for a number
25of years while they are enrolled in charters and after they leave charters. While impacts
for either type of charter are relatively stable as time in the charter increases, the discipline
and attendance impacts found in startups do not persist after students return to regular
public schools so there does not appear to be long-term behavioral improvements. This
result suggests that any non-cognitive skills that have improved in startup charters require
constant reinforcement.
Nonetheless, I caution that while the discipline and attendance results are intriguing
they may re
ect reporting or enforcement dierences. The lack of persistence increases this
concern as such a result is consistent with reporting bias. Since attendance is dicult to
manipulate or misreport, this is mainly a concern for discipline. Thus, I provide multiple
pieces of indirect evidence that suggests the discipline results, at least in part, re
ect real
behavioral changes in the startup charter students. In particular, the large impacts on
attendance buttress the discipline improvements and combined, they provide substantial
evidence that startups generate non-cognitive skill improvements in spite of the lack of
cognitive skill improvement.
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29Appendix
Proof of Expected Value of Level and Value-Added Fixed Eects Estimates Bounding the
Lagged-Dependent Variable Model with Fixed Eects
Let us rst simplify notation and denote X as a k  nt vector of demeaned covariates
while Y is a 1nt vector of the demeaned student outcome variable and Yt 1 is the 1nt
vector of demeaned once-lagged outcome variables. Our true model becomes
(6) Yt = X + Yt 1
 + 
In a levels framework, the lagged outcomes enter into the error term such that we have
composite error
(7)  = 
Yt 1 + :
This provides us with
(8) E(^ 





For a value added model we subtract Yt 1 from each side of (6) to get
(9) Yt   Yt 1 = X + (
   1)Yt 1 + 
which will provide us with an estimate of  such that
(10) E(^ 





30Let us further dene the matrix A = [X0X] 1[X0E(Yt 1)] and the kth row of A as Ak, hence
(11) E(^ 
L




k ) = k + (
   1)Ak
Thus, assuming that 0  
  1, if Ak > 0 then E(^ L
k) >  > E(^ VA
k ) while if Ak < 0 then
E(^ L
k) <  < E(^ VA
k ). In either case, the levels model and value added models bound .
















































































Sources: 1997 - 1998, US Dept. of Education National Charter School Reports.  1999 - 2003, US Dept. of Education Common Core of Data.  2005, National 
Alliance for Public Charter Schools.  2006, Center for Education Reform.  2004 data are unavailable so a linear interpolation is provided
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Years Before and After
Graph shows residuals from a regression of test scores on observables included in the baseline
model excluding charter status.  All variables are demeaned within students to remove the
individual fixed effect.
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Years Before and After
Graph shows residuals from a regression of test scores on observables included in the baseline
model excluding charter status.  All variables are demeaned within students to remove the
individual fixed effect.






















-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Startup, Math Startup, Reading Startup, Language









































Years Before and After
Graph shows residuals from a regression of test scores on observables included in the baseline
model excluding charter status.  All variables are demeaned within students to remove the
individual fixed effect.
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Years Before and After
Graph shows residuals from a regression of test scores on observables included in the baseline
model excluding charter status.  All variables are demeaned within students to remove the
individual fixed effect.
Figure 7: Discipline & Attendance by Before and After Charter ExitVariable
0.49 0.47 0.48 -0.03 -0.02 -0.11
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.97) (0.93) (0.95)
[0.7] [1.1] [0.1] [1.0]
0.10 0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.06 -0.11
(0.30) (0.16) (0.11) (0.98) (0.90) (0.92)
[4.5] [7.8] [0.5] [0.9]
0.33 0.31 0.50 -0.02 -0.04 -0.08
(0.47) (0.46) (0.50) (0.98) (0.91) (0.94)
[0.3] [1.2] [0.2] [0.6]
0.54 0.66 0.48 0.44 0.16 0.35
(0.50) (0.47) (0.50) (1.37) (0.73) (1.29)
[1.5] [0.5] [4.3] [0.4]
5.85 6.53 3.74 0.0074 0.0073 0.0007
(3.33) (3.50) (2.07) (0.13) (0.12) (0.03)
[0.5] [3.0] [0.0] [5.6]
0.60 0.58 0.79 0.0047 0.0024 0.0019
(0.49) (0.49) (0.41) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06)
[0.5] [9.4] [1.4] [2.7]
0.07 0.11 0.08 0.0359 0.0163 0.0498
(0.25) (0.31) (0.27) (0.22) (0.15) (0.27)
[6.1] [1.6] [2.1] [0.7]
0.05 0.11 0.07 94.4 93.2 95.7
(0.23) (0.32) (0.25) (8.89) (11.98) (5.97)




0.58 0.65 0.59 4054 5511 3688
(0.49) (0.48) (0.49) (5668) (5341) (743)
[0.9] [0.2] [1.8] [1.7]
0.11 0.05 0.11 519 164 455
(0.32) (0.21) (0.32) (1670) (350) (158)
[6.0] [0.1] [4.6] [1.0]
0.10 0.01 0.05 936 254 918
(0.30) (0.12) (0.23) (1363) (322) (389)
[6.3] [3.6] [8.1] [0.1]
0.13 0.13 0.09 739 225 599
(0.33) (0.34) (0.29) (509) (263) (277)









Demographics (Student Level Observations)
Attendance Rate




























Stanadard deviations in parentheses.  Absolute T-statistics from a regression of the variable on startup and conversion status in brackets.  
Test scores are standard deviation units from scale scores normalized within grade and year.  Spending figures are per-pupil. 
Demographics, attendance, and general infractions include 2.45 million student-year observations.  Due to limited years of availability 
substance abuse and violence infractions include 1.79 million observations while fighting includes approximately 700,000 observations. 
Test scores include 1.2 million observations.  School characteristics include approximately 3900 school-year observations.
Conversion Startup Non-Charter Conversion
Hispanic
BlackMath Reading Language Obs Math Reading Language Obs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.072 0.015 0.022 0.026 -0.033 -0.007
(0.052) (0.038) (0.033) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023)
0.070** 0.029 0.041* 0.026 -0.019 0.014
(0.033) (0.026) (0.024) (0.034) (0.021) (0.021)
0.060 0.010 0.013 0.062 0.002 0.015
(0.055) (0.041) (0.036) (0.051) (0.038) (0.031)
0.081** 0.040 0.048* 0.070* 0.030 0.042
(0.039) (0.032) (0.028) (0.041) (0.035) (0.027)
0.056 0.009 0.006 0.041 -0.008 0.001
(0.054) (0.041) (0.036) (0.051) (0.038) (0.032)
0.084** 0.042 0.043 0.070* 0.029 0.038
(0.041) (0.033) (0.029) (0.042) (0.036) (0.029)
0.049 0.003 0.011 0.059 -0.009 0.006
(0.040) (0.028) (0.022) (0.036) (0.033) (0.024)
0.073*** 0.029 0.054*** 0.063 0.001 0.028
(0.022) (0.022) (0.017) (0.043) (0.028) (0.022)
0.053 0.004 0.012 0.075** -0.005 0.007
(0.039) (0.028) (0.022) (0.036) (0.034) (0.026)
0.071*** 0.028 0.054*** 0.051 -0.008 0.031
(0.022) (0.022) (0.017) (0.041) (0.028) (0.021)
0.065 0.005 0.018 0.100** 0.014 0.043
(0.042) (0.026) (0.024) (0.046) (0.032) (0.037)
0.044* 0.018 0.063*** 0.015 -0.037 0.066**

























All regressions include an individual fixed-effect, free lunch status, reduced-price lunch status, other economic disadvantage, recent immigration status, whether a parent is a migrant worker, and 
grade-by-year indicators.  Standard errors clustered by school in parentheses.  *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  Levels models cover 1998 - 2006 and 
grades 1 - 11.  Value-added models cover 1999 - 2006 and grades 2 - 11.  Because students are defined to be in the sample in the first grade and year of each sample, these observations are 
dropped from the Kyriazidou attrition analysis.
Table 2 - Effect of Attending a Charter School on Test Scores
OLS with Student 
Fixed Effects
Interrupted Panel
Drop Year Prior to 
Charter


















(1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.795*** 2.268*** 2,233,050 -0.498*** 2.338*** 1,777,994
(0.113) (0.607) (0.151) (0.757)
0.023 -0.044 0.005 0.047
(0.070) (0.186) (0.058) (0.167)
-0.789*** 2.149*** 2,221,517 -0.789*** 1.852*** 1,758,480
(0.101) (0.545) (0.085) (0.364)
0.028 -0.045 0.024 0.199
(0.074) (0.182) (0.088) (0.174)
-0.775*** 2.058*** 2,211,570 -0.797*** 1.873*** 1,756,982
(0.088) (0.491) (0.084) (0.367)
0.026 0.025 0.024 0.181
(0.078) (0.177) (0.089) (0.178)
-0.809*** 2.467** 1,457,716 -0.849*** 3.071*** 1,067,566
(0.171) (1.027) (0.208) (1.129)
0.029 0.017 0.034 0.032
(0.073) (0.194) (0.094) (0.171)
-0.818*** 2.500** 1,457,716 -0.842*** 3.242*** 1,067,566
(0.174) (1.015) (0.216) (1.203)
0.034 0.017 0.062 0.061
(0.075) (0.194) (0.102) (0.172)
-0.879*** 3.125** 1,457,716 -0.865*** 4.721*** 1,067,566
(0.190) (1.218) (0.302) (1.646)
0.109 0.013 0.271* 0.143








-0.250*** -0.0036*** -0.020*** 0.0024*
(0.036) (0.0013) (0.004) (0.0014)
0.002 -0.0016** -0.005** -0.0001
(0.015) (0.0007) (0.002) (0.0001)
(0.156) 1,740,282 1,740,282 1,777,994




All regressions include an individual fixed-effect, free lunch status, reduced-price lunch status, other economic disadvantage, recent immigration status, 
whether a parent is a migrant worker, and grade-by-year indicators.  Standard errors clustered by school in parentheses.  *, **, *** denote significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  Levels models cover 1994 - 2006 and grades 1 - 12 and value-added models 1994 - 2006 and grades 2 - 12 for 
discipline and attendance.  Because students are defined to be in the sample in the first grade and year of each sample, these observations are dropped from 
the Kyriazidou attrition analysis.  Additional outcomes cover all grades 1 - 12 but retention, expulsion, and AEP placement are not available in all years.









First - Differences 
(Unweighted)
Drop 2 Years Prior 
to Charter















A. Disciplinary Infrations and Attendance
Conversion
ii. Value-Added i. LevelsMath Reading Language Discipline Attendance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
-0.010 -0.005 -0.011 -0.182*** -0.029
(0.042) (0.033) (0.035) (0.035) (0.103)
0.192*** 0.070** 0.087*** -0.751*** 1.636***
(0.056) (0.034) (0.028) (0.099) (0.235)
-0.011 -0.034 -0.019 -0.734*** 3.591***
(0.103) (0.102) (0.084) (0.156) (0.617)
Observations 1,141,480 1,141,480 1,141,480 2,233,050 2,233,050
-0.011 -0.058 -0.045 -0.333*** 0.231
(0.056) (0.036) (0.038) (0.102) (0.224)
0.082 0.063 0.056 -0.344** 0.999***
(0.061) (0.050) (0.049) (0.152) (0.240)
-0.013 -0.017 0.032 -0.068 3.503***
(0.074) (0.065) (0.050) (0.212) (0.854)
Observations 779,343 779,343 779,343 1,777,994 1,777,994
0.046 0.040 0.031 -0.653*** 5.941***
(0.045) (0.044) (0.027) (0.098) (2.161)
0.027 -0.027 0.026 0.032 -4.167***
(0.055) (0.056) (0.050) (0.072) (1.405)
-0.021 -0.118** -0.054* -0.038 -4.229**
(0.065) (0.052) (0.030) (0.109) (1.922)
0.139 0.004 0.030 -0.205* -2.547*
(0.088) (0.048) (0.031) (0.111) (1.302)
0.010 -0.010 -0.019 -0.269*** -4.842*
(0.062) (0.063) (0.047) (0.083) (2.757)
0.093 0.038 0.017 0.033 -0.016
(0.071) (0.034) (0.043) (0.062) (0.208)
-0.008 0.017 0.017 -0.131* 0.134
(0.031) (0.023) (0.016) (0.076) (0.226)
0.056 0.039 0.100 0.037 -0.192
(0.083) (0.051) (0.062) (0.068) (0.258)
0.030 0.047 0.064 -0.048 -0.041
(0.127) (0.106) (0.070) (0.033) (0.201)
-0.126 -0.089* -0.022 0.060 -0.146
(0.097) (0.050) (0.057) (0.078) (0.244)
Observations 1,141,480 1,141,480 1,141,480 2,233,050 2,233,050
Convert * 5+ Years
Convert
Each column in each panel is a separate regression.  All regressions include an individual fixed-effect, free lunch status, reduced-price lunch 
status, other economic disadvantage, recent immigration status, whether a parent is a migrant worker, and grade-by-year indicators. Standard 
errors clustered by school in parentheses.  *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  Levels models cover 1998 - 
2006 and grades 1 - 11 for test scores and 1994 - 2006 and grades 1 - 12 for other outcomes.  Value-added models cover 1999 - 2006 and grade 2 - 
11 for test scores and 1994 - 2006 and grades 2 - 12 for other outcomes.  Columns in each panel show separate regressions.  Grade-level 
regressions also contain an indicator for conversion charters, but since only one conversion covers grades 7 - 8 and no conversions cover grades 9 - 
12, I do not separate that estimate by grade level.  Value-added results for age of charter are similar to levels results and are available in the online 
appendix.
B. Impacts by Age of Charter (Levels)
Startup
Startup * 2 Years
Convert * 4 Years
Convert * 3 Years
Startup * 3 Years
Startup * 4 Years
Startup * 5+ Years
i.  Levels
Startup * Grades 9 - 12
ii. Value-Added
Startup
Table 4:  Charter Impacts by Grade Level and Age of Charter
Startup * Grades 6 - 8
Startup
A. Impacts by Grade Level
Startup * Grades 6 - 8
Startup * Grades 9 - 12
Convert * 2 YearsMath Reading Language Discipline Attendance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0.286 0.086 -0.024 -0.948*** 2.601***
(0.185) (0.086) (0.074) (0.120) (0.956)
-0.238 -0.087 0.034 0.228* -1.094
(0.166) (0.076) (0.058) (0.119) (0.740)
-0.305** -0.133*** -0.006 -0.098 0.434
(0.154) (0.045) (0.027) (0.093) (0.467)
0.056** 0.005 0.013 0.238*** 0.055
(0.027) (0.022) (0.019) (0.074) (0.244)
-0.028 -0.024* -0.020 -0.039 -0.090
(0.025) (0.013) (0.017) (0.043) (0.268)
0.034 0.030 0.018 0.078** -1.358**
(0.030) (0.019) (0.025) (0.033) (0.565)
Observations 1,141,480 1,141,480 1,141,480 2,233,050 2,233,050
0.027 -0.102* -0.158*** -0.745*** 3.381**
(0.061) (0.058) (0.048) (0.219) (1.404)
0.054 0.093 0.196*** 0.075 -1.908
(0.061) (0.060) (0.044) (0.161) (1.506)
-0.024 0.011 0.141*** -0.052 -0.060
(0.038) (0.056) (0.044) (0.072) (1.150)
0.034* -0.034* -0.042* 0.381** 0.329
(0.019) (0.019) (0.024) (0.151) (0.429)
-0.041 0.014 -0.003 -0.071 0.021
(0.029) (0.040) (0.022) (0.093) (0.540)
0.053* -0.034 -0.033 0.058 -0.409**
(0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.042) (0.163)
Observations 779,343 779,343 779,343 1,777,994 1,777,994
Startup * Immigrant
Each column in each panel is a separate regression. All regressions include an individual fixed-effect, free lunch status, 
reduced-price lunch status, other economic disadvantage, recent immigration status, whether a parent is a migrant worker, 
and grade-by-year indicators.  Regressions also include the main effect and the same set of interactions for conversion 
charters along with startup and conversion interactions with other non-white students.  These students make up less than 
1% of startup and 4% of conversion charter students.   Full results are available in the online appendix.  Standard errors 
clustered by school in parentheses.  *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  Levels 
models cover 1998 - 2006 and grades 1 - 11 for test scores and 1994 - 2006 and grades 1 - 12 for other outcomes.  Value-





Table 5:  Startup Charter Impacts by Student Characteristics
Startup * Female













Coefficient -0.795*** 2.268*** -0.498*** 2.338***
(0.113) (0.607) (0.151) (0.757)
Observations 2,233,050 2,233,050 1,777,994 1,777,994
Coefficient -0.799*** 2.318*** -0.536*** 2.406***
(0.121) (0.582) (0.139) (0.791)
Observations 2,221,995 2,221,995 1,769,243 1,769,243
Coefficient -0.852*** 1.908*** -0.586*** 2.276***
(0.131) (0.583) (0.183) (0.759)
Observations 2,223,425 2,223,425 1,770,359 1,770,359
Coefficient -0.849*** 1.716*** -0.520** 2.073***
(0.129) (0.613) (0.205) (0.756)
Observations 2,221,995 2,221,995 1,769,243 1,769,243
Coefficient -0.755*** 1.733*** -0.354** 1.823**
(0.115) (0.641) (0.144) (0.733)
Observations 2,221,995 2,221,995 1,769,243 1,769,243
Coefficient -0.798*** 2.343*** -0.341* 2.099***
(0.113) (0.582) (0.184) (0.680)
Observations 2,232,700 2,232,700 1,777,666 1,777,666
Coefficient -0.550*** 2.899*** -0.125 2.277***
(0.129) (0.706) (0.200) (0.837)
Observations 2,232,700 2,232,700 1,777,666 1,777,666
Each coefficient is from a separate regression.  All regressions include an individual fixed-effect, free lunch status, reduced-price lunch status, other 
economic disadvantage, recent immigration status, whether a parent is a migrant worker, and grade-by-year indicators.  Regressions also include a 
conversion charter estimate that is not shown here.  Additional controls for potential charter mechanisms are added as described above.   Each 
row/column combination is a separate regression with both conversion and startup charter estimates.  Full results are provided in the online appendix.   
Standard errors clustered by school in parentheses.  *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Controlling for Enrollment (7)
Controlling for Student Body Composition (6)
Controlling for Per-Student 




 Controlling Per-Student Other Expenditures (4)
Controlling Per-Student School Leadership 
Expenditures
(3)
Controlling for Per-Student Instructional 
Expenditures
(2)
Table 6 - Mechanisms of Discipline and Attendance Impacts in Startup Charters
A. Levels B. Value-Added
Baseline (from tables 2, 3)Math Reading Language Discipline Attendance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Startup - 1 Year 0.013 -0.016 -0.004 -0.837*** 3.270***
(0.060) (0.045) (0.042) (0.115) (1.009)
Startup - 2 Years 0.008 -0.062 -0.008 -1.042*** 2.197***
(0.078) (0.075) (0.059) (0.200) (0.412)
Startup - 3 Years -0.114 -0.128 -0.122 -0.981*** 3.756***
(0.098) (0.106) (0.082) (0.168) (0.660)
Startup - 4+ Years 0.151 -0.122 -0.042 -1.577*** 11.774
(0.270) (0.150) (0.130) (0.354) (10.629)
Conversion - 1 Year 0.095* 0.056* 0.064* 0.006 0.029
(0.050) (0.029) (0.039) (0.048) (0.179)
Conversion - 2 Years -0.013 -0.074 -0.007 0.075 -0.175
(0.138) (0.100) (0.091) (0.082) (0.360)
Conversion - 3 Years 0.062 0.031 -0.020 -0.182 0.564
(0.139) (0.093) (0.061) (0.111) (0.421)
Conversion - 4+ Years 0.019 0.000 0.095 -0.207* 0.984*
(0.137) (0.142) (0.086) (0.118) (0.535)
Observations 1,141,480 1,141,480 1,141,480 2,233,050 2,233,050
Startup - 1 Year 0.053 -0.006 0.046 -0.792*** 3.800***
(0.052) (0.039) (0.047) (0.222) (1.408)
Startup - 2 Years -0.005 -0.084* 0.017 -0.226* 1.700***
(0.068) (0.050) (0.048) (0.122) (0.442)
Startup - 3 Years 0.159 0.103 0.121 -0.232 3.645***
(0.163) (0.112) (0.089) (0.359) (0.636)
Startup - 4+ Years 0.446** 0.202* 0.375** -0.035 7.327
(0.183) (0.120) (0.148) (0.731) (5.546)
Conversion - 1 Year 0.069 -0.021 0.053 0.004 0.148
(0.108) (0.075) (0.055) (0.063) (0.203)
Conversion - 2 Years -0.163 -0.179 0.018 -0.186** 0.477
(0.155) (0.112) (0.087) (0.093) (0.329)
Conversion - 3 Years 0.335** 0.165 0.253 -0.208** 0.740
(0.165) (0.139) (0.223) (0.097) (0.501)
Conversion - 4+ Years 0.012 0.001 0.255 -0.150 0.992
(0.332) (0.218) (0.171) (0.094) (0.604)
Observations 779,343 779,343 779,343 1,777,994 1,777,994
Table 7: Charter Impacts by Time in Charter
B. Value-Added
A. Levels
Each column in each panel is a separate regression.  All regressions include an individual fixed-effect, 
free lunch status, reduced-price lunch status, other economic disadvantage, recent immigration status, 
whether a parent is a migrant worker, and grade-by-year indicators. In 2SLS models, all post first-year 
periods are instrumented by the potential number of years the student could have been in the charter 
school based on date of birth.  Standard errors clustered by school in parentheses.  *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.    Levels models cover 1998 - 2006 and grades 
1 - 11 for test scores and 1994 - 2006 and grades 1 - 12 for other outcomes.  Value-added models cover 
1999 - 2006 and grade 2 - 11 for test scores and 1994 - 2006 and grades 2 - 12 for other outcomes.Math Reading Language Discipline Attendance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0.134* 0.025 0.043 -0.749*** 2.502***
(0.071) (0.054) (0.046) (0.125) (0.711)
0.199*** 0.038 0.096** 0.100 0.601
(0.065) (0.048) (0.045) (0.173) (0.555)
0.194 -0.002 -0.006 -0.142 -0.060
(0.172) (0.167) (0.171) (0.166) (1.235)
-0.062 -0.071* 0.001 0.093 -0.745**
(0.044) (0.043) (0.038) (0.121) (0.290)
-0.203*** -0.169** -0.074 0.045 -1.103**
(0.063) (0.070) (0.057) (0.189) (0.438)
-0.180** -0.133* -0.069 0.031 -1.279***
(0.070) (0.071) (0.062) (0.163) (0.439)
F-Test of All Post-Startup Estimates 3.48*** 0.92 2.05* 2.52** 0.79
F-Test of All Post-Conversion Estimates 3.14** 1.58 1.13 1.23 4.24***
Observations 1,141,480 1,141,480 1,141,480 2,233,050 2,233,050
0.011 -0.065* 0.004 -0.375** 2.453***
(0.036) (0.035) (0.033) (0.150) (0.867)
-0.027 -0.068 0.075 1.034*** -0.954*
(0.074) (0.047) (0.054) (0.245) (0.505)
-0.045 -0.356** -0.068 -0.065 0.627
(0.214) (0.168) (0.200) (0.206) (0.905)
-0.122 -0.201 -0.082 0.107 -0.714***
(0.122) (0.130) (0.070) (0.124) (0.242)
-0.229 -0.255 -0.138 0.127 -1.440***
(0.175) (0.190) (0.098) (0.279) (0.380)
-0.183 -0.250 -0.141* 0.045 -1.123***
(0.145) (0.157) (0.077) (0.128) (0.316)
F-Test of All Post-Startup Estimates 1.25 1.74 0.84 7.02*** 2.62**
F-Test of All Post-Conversion Estimates 0.51 1.20 1.49 1.73 5.31***
Observations 779,343 779,343 779,343 1,777,994 1,777,994
4+ Years Post-Startup
1 Years Post-Conversion













Each column in each panel is a separate regression.  Two and three year post-charter estimates are similar to the one and four-year 
estimates so I do not show them here, though the full set of results are provided in the online appendix.  All regressions include an 
individual fixed-effect, free lunch status, reduced-price lunch status, other economic disadvantage, recent immigration status, whether a 
parent is a migrant worker, and grade-by-year indicators. All post charter periods are instrumented by whether the student is the listed 
number of years beyond the last grade level covered by his or her prior charter school.  Standard errors clustered by school in 
parentheses.  *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.    Levels models cover 1998 - 2006 and grades 
1 - 11 for test scores and 1994 - 2006 and grades 1 - 12 for other outcomes.  Value-added models cover 1999 - 2006 and grade 2 - 11 for 
test scores and 1994 - 2006 and grades 2 - 12 for other outcomes.